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How do humans relate to their technology? This is not a new question, many have struggled with it. 
What we want to do here is to make it visible through another vocabulary, the virtual. We are going to 
unpack this vocabulary by reconfiguring the traditional moves that start with distinct categories of 
human things and technical things and seek to explain one category in terms of the activities of the 
other. Through the Actor Network Theory (ANT) we will opt for Allegoresis as another register or 
vocabulary that makes technology and people visible. Through Latours’s recent work we find our way 
to Walter Benjamin and his take on Leibniz’s Monadology as a way of understanding the Kantian 
symbolic mode in historical terms. Benjamin asks for an account of stability from historical change and 
reinterpretation. The relationship between movement and moments is what we want to describe as 
that between the virtual and the actual. Moreover, it is this vocabulary that helps us understand or 
make visible the constant rewriting that any technology goes through as it is configured and 
reconfigured as humans and non-humans are arranged in historically contingent ways.  
We are then going to play out the virtual or arrive at it as we look to notice the arrangements of people 
and technology in a photographic club where members are beginning to use digital technologies. 
Obvious Questions 
A set of obvious questions present themselves when thinking about technology and people: who is 
using it?, what are they using it for?, where and when do they use it? In addition, which bits of 
technology are they using? Directed at our digital hobbyists all these questions seek to understand 
how the bits of digital technology enter the home of human practice. This type of research agenda 
assumes a categorical distinction between human activity and technology. Here is an example; Hamill 
(2000) starts with this categorical distinction and asks how new technologies get into the home. These 
questions are sorted out in terms of some economic considerations. She believes that: 
“Economic principles should be treated as fundamental to the design process […] 
the demand of new gadgets in the home will be determined by the same general 
factors as the demand far any other item”.  
The key principle that informs the set of variables that Hamill wants new technologies to appear in is 
utility. She says: 
“The economic theory of consumer behaviour is based on the assumption that households 
want to maximise their utility subject to a budget constraint”.  
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Utility usually means welfare, budget constraints refers to income and the pricing of goods but also to 
limits on time. Technological uptake is determined by its ability to satisfy welfare issues within the 
limits of income and available time. Hamill concludes that new technologies are taken up in the first 
instance by the wealthy, that using up time dampens demand for a new technology, and that people 
find out about technologies through positive feed back about the technology from others.  
Hamill invokes economic variables to organise successful and unsuccessful technologies. Moreover, 
according to Hamill from the register of economics, we can design successful technologies. From the 
start, humans have problems set out in economic terms and technologies offer solutions from which 
we need to discern successful from unsuccessful solutions. What constitutes a good technology is not 
in the technology but resides in another register or economy of explanation. Economics has to do with 
distinctly human activities and attributes, demographics, demand, desires and tastes. As such the co-
ordinates of what is good technologically are plotted out in terms of Hamill’s societal variables as 
distinct from the terms and activities of a world of technology. The former is imposed onto the later to 
organise it. Society or economics sorts out what we understand of technology. The co-ordinates of 
technology as a solution are set out by the kind of problematisation that is secured in the economy of 
explanation that is the economic register.  
Questioning people and technology in these terms sets the research process of making phenomena 
visible in terms of two categories of activity already set out; the human and the technical. The usual 
way to sort out technology and people analytically is to start with the assumption that they should be 
treated as separate territories of activity. Questioning concerning technology is concerned with issues 
around the entry of one camp into the other and interactions or directions of influence between them. 
We can now go off and start counting technologies and recording how they get into the home. 
Advertising Worlds 
Technology is a problem for us in the home. From what constitutes the right kit to the uses technology 
is put to, to whether or not we need it at all. If we should be asking about the nature of the passage of 
technology into the home then adverts present no problem for our analysis. They must facilitate the 
passage of technology into the home and help us spot the gap in our homes that the technology is 
supposed to fill. This form of explanation reduces adverts to notification of instrumentality or the latest 
solution.  
Is this adequate? There is no end of solutions suggested by manufactures. Sony recently ran an 
advertising campaign for one of its digital cameras in which a woman starts out from home on her way 
to a club for the evening. From her home and all the way to the club she takes photographs with her 
digital camera of key locations and landmarks. At the club, she sees a guy we can assume she quite 
likes and drops the camera that has a LCD screen for viewing images contained in it into his coat 
pocket. Then she leaves. The man takes the camera and cycles back through the images to find his 
way back to her home. What are we being sold? Not only a camera but also a new use for it 
embedded in nightclub behaviour. The world in the advert constructs a space where it makes sense to 
drop a piece of expensive equipment into a stranger’s pocket safe in the knowledge that he would 
know what to do with it. Where cameras have cultural currency as navigation tools and images are 
disposable directional notes. Where “social” behaviours secure the return of your technology by 
constructing social channels for it to move along. Is this technology for technologies sake, where Sony 
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have to invent a use perhaps to sell us the idea that technologies like this are open to inventive 
activity?  
Kodak marketed their camera differently majoring on the capture and “off loading” facilities when used 
in conjunction with a PC. No particular image practice is suggested but other technology that is 
referred to afford different economies of use. The off loading dock connected into a PC allows images 
and texts to be combined; it also makes e-mail facilities available:  
“Place your DX3500 camera in its dock, press the button, and you're ready to print 
and e-mail with ease. You'll never miss a picture-taking opportunity since your 
camera batteries are recharged every time you rest the camera in the Dock.”  
Are these ways of easing the passage between camps? Is it enough to argue that these adverts tell 
people about how technologies in terms of means to an end. Is the digital camera really the dating 
technology we have been waiting for? Alternatively, is there something more complicated that we 
need to notice, e.g. technology and social activity mixed up into worlds? For instance, Sony present us 
with a scene and a use for the camera which would only be possible if dating behaviour were to be 
dramatically transformed, as would attitudes towards expensive technology and theft. In short, a whole 
world of practice, culture, technology and sites of activity have to be arranged in order for it to make 
sense to leave your digital camera behind. A world in which things need to be arranged to make 
sense.  
This is what we want to describe, not advertising but arrangements of people, technology and 
practices that support and configure one another into worlds. The two adverts present two very 
different ideas on what a digital camera is for and what it consists of. Both these adverts see 
manufactures mixing up social practice and different configurations of technologies into different 
economies of activities. Thinking about how we might theorise and analytically approach these mixes 
and movements in what constitutes a technology and social activity presents a problem for us as 
researchers. We want to think about understanding the relationship between technology and people. 
ANT helps in our search for allegory.  
The challenge as Callon (1986) puts it to us is to maintain a single register rather than switching 
between technical things and human things. This is what ANT writers have sought to do by collapsing 
the society/technology distinction. The single register is translation, a vocabulary as Law (1992) says 
that allows us to describe how people and objects become arranged into networks. Where the social 
no longer constitutes a purely human category of explanation and agency but rather a mixture of 
human and non-humans equally organising each other. He says: 
 “This, then, is the crucial analytical move made by actor-network writers: the 
suggestion that the social is nothing other than patterned networks of heterogeneous 
materials. This is a radical claim because it says that these networks are composed 
not only of people, but also of machines, animals, texts, money, and architectures — 
any material that you care to mention. So the argument is that the stuff of the social 
isn't simply human”.  
The claim is that all is the product of networks of heterogeneous elements that once were divided in 
the old categorical settlement. It is not a claim that says all technology is now included or pushed 
further into the social categories. It is a claim that reconfigures the social as neither a human nor a 
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purely technical category. As such the move is to dissolve categories into activity in a single register 
and vocabulary. Callon (1986) and Law (1992) amongst others seek: 
“To explore the process that is often called translation which generates ordering 
effects such as devices, agents, institutions, or organisations. So translation is a 
verb which implies transformation and the possibility of equivalence, the possibility 
that one thing (for example, an actor) may stand for another (for instance a network)” 
(Law 1992). 
The important move is to say that actors have no meaning or identity outside of their relations to other 
objects. There is no universal category that they belong to supply identity. Once arranged or 
performed then attribution of identity or cause is the last move (Latour 1986). In order to argue for a 
new register, we have to understand the duality of Hamill’s register. 
Allegory and Symbolic unity 
Society in Hamill’s explanation occurs twice, first as society and secondly in the realm of technology. 
Technologies become examples, symbols, or signifiers of society’s activity and attributes. Society 
becomes the signified. Hamill hopes to discern truths about the category of society or economics by 
capturing its appearance in the realm of signifiers that technology is. 
Once we have chosen our signifiers our job is to make sure of their validity: do patterns of 
technological uptake as my measures (the signifiers) reflect or signify accurately the convolutions of a 
complex society (the signified)? Since signifiers are occasioned manifestations of the signified their 
content needs extracting from the “noise” that constitutes their form. Serres (1982) says mathematical 
abstract explanations require the cutting away of empirically difference in representations to point to 
an abstracted signified idea. The aim is to find the signifiers in amongst the noise of occasioned 
activity. Statistical analysis and the mathematical discernment of variables from noise or confounding 
variables represent an economy of managing the purity of signifiers. Part of the theory talk that goes 
on in the research is about arguing for the inclusion and exclusion of variables. Once theoretically 
underpinned they are converted into statistical operations. Indeed Hamill is keen to say that we need 
to consider all sorts of features of the form of technology including its time saving potential because 
one feature of society or economics’ content is limited time and money before finding measures of 
these.  
We want to call this the symbolic mode. In the same way the form solutions take is understood to 
represent the content of the problem. Technological solutions contain the problems they solve. They 
let us in on why they are there because the problem constructs the form of the solutions. The logical 
unity of these formulas of explanation comes because the structure of solutions is sorted out and 
logically represents the shape of the problem. Solutions are understood in terms of realisation.  
Logical unity is a core notion in Kant’s view of the symbolic mode. Bell (1997) explains the Kantian 
notion of the symbol. Kant makes a distinction between two forms of representation: the symbolic and 
the schematical. The schematical mode, says Bell, represents concepts to us by demonstration. The 
demonstrative object stands as an analogue to the concept having no meaning on its own only by 
virtue of its alignment with the concept as a vehicle. There is a difference between content and form in 
the schematical or allegorical mode. The demonstrating object transports the content of the concept 
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but through the object’s form, this is translation: displacement of content through transformation of 
form. The symbolic form however sees a unity of content and form. Bell quotes Kant: “The symbolic 
form presents us with something for which no sensory representation would be appropriate, it gives us 
access through the particular to the general ‘idea’”. As such the symbol is at the same time the idea 
manifested and tangible in its form and content just as the solution logically represents the problem. 
We see this unity between symbol and signified in the above explanations and research methods. We 
look for examples of the thing we can’t get accesses to through our measures, society variables or 
society in technology which are at the same time form and content examples of the wider idea. 
Technology represents society as its form is derived from it. 
Historical Form 
Hetherington and Law give us a useful insight into the nature of this of symbolic unity. If concepts are 
mediated by another’s form in allegorical representation then symbolic representational unity claims 
unmediated communication. A unity between objects and their signs between the content and the form 
of communication between seeing the object (the content) and saying (the form) the object, between 
measures (form) and phenomena (content). However, unity is illusionary because the form or sign 
points beyond itself.  
Latour (1999) describes the symbolic mode of unmediated communication when he argues that the 
correspondence that modernity assumes between speaking and seeing requires us to except an 
unmediated leap across the gap between signified and signifier. However, Latour argues that “The cat 
is on the mat”, as a sentence is not the cat sat on the mat in front of the speaker. It is a complex series 
of culturally and historically contingent displacements and transformations through which words come 
to stand for things. Cat is a transformation and displacement of the object. The object as content has 
no unity with the form of its vehicle of displacement, which transforms it, i.e. the word cat. Since cat is 
an arrangement of the world, it makes the object visible through historically contingent alignments. 
This is the Modern epistme for Latour. We are asked to buy into the notion that content dictates form 
and ignore the fact that form is actually historically contingent and is always a transformation and 
displacement of content. Latour gives form or technology a voice as it becomes part of what is 
arranged to make things visible.  
Hetherington and Law, in a draft paper called “Allegory and interference: Representation in sociology”, 
agree with Latour and say that the “Modern [epistemological] project seeks to let the eye speak 
directly but in allegory the relation is less direct”. In the system of allegory, we have seen that things 
stand for things that are not present. As Hetherington and Law say, “allegory relies on similitude, on a 
chain of signifiers where there is no direct correspondence between matching signifier and signified. 
Instead, there is a mobile play of connections between them.” What the allegorical buys us is more 
than a vision of the space between signified and signifier as if tying a moving sign to a fixed signifier. It 
allows us to see that what was once read as the signifier or form is now read as an allegorical 
achievement and it becomes the mode of constructing or locating or making visible the signified. The 
content or signified is constituted as it is given form that is as it is translated into a particular context.  
Latour (1999) explains through his example of the pedocomparator that contains samples of soil 
arranged in terms of depth and area, etc. The soil samples in the pedocomparator are not explained 
by the forest floor, which they come to represent, rather, the forest floor is made visible by its 
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translation. The pedocomparator is a set of its transformations and displacements where by the forest 
floor is moved and described in terms of the features of the pedocomparator.  
  
Figure 1 from Latour (1999). 
 
The pedocomparator is another set of technical, scientific, socially arranged practices that perform or 
articulate the forest in terms of a particular economy of inquiry and issues to be addresses. Figure 1 
from Latour shows the move of displacements and transformations. Each transformation is a 
reconfiguration of an object in terms of a new set of practices that give it form. Since all form is 
historical contingent, it is always open to further transformations and displacements.  
The diagram describes the existence of an object, phenomena, society of microbes in terms of their 
history or movement through transformations and displacements. Historicity is essential for Latour. He 
asks: “did ferments exist before Pasteur made them up?”. There is no avoiding the answer: “No, they 
did not exist before he came along”. We might ask: did society exist before Hamill describes or makes 
up its features in terms of what technology is successful and in demand? We would have to answer: 
no. We would have problems with these assertions if we observed the society/nature dichotomy and 
kept objects separate from subjects. As Latour argues in Pandora’s hope (1999), this dichotomy 
forces us to read these assertions as if we mean that Hamill makes up or invents society: 
“The subject-object dichotomy distributed activity and passivity in such a way that 
whatever was taken by one was lost to the other. If Pasteur makes up the microbes 
[with his lab equipment and measures], that is, invents them, then the microbes are 
passive. If the microbes lead Pasteur in his thinking then it is he who is the passive 
observer of their activity”. 
So the assertion that Hamill (2000) makes up society is meant to suggest that her techniques of 
isolating variables do all the construction work, as opposed to the idea that her variables are passive 
measures that reflect and are constructed by society. Instead, as Latour argues: 
“We have begun to understand, however, that the human-nonhumans does not 
involve a tug of war between two opposite forces. On the contrary, the more activity 
there is from one, the more activity there is from the other. The more Pasteur works 
in his laboratory, the more autonomous his ferment becomes”. 
As the microbes encounter Pasteur they are transformed in terms of Pasteur and his techniques of 
scientific enquiry at the same time, those techniques and scientific practices are transformed to 
perform the microbes as microbes. Techniques are altered and experiments designed to isolate or 
describe characteristics of the microbes. The characteristics are worked up in terms of equipment and 
practice and are attributed to the microbes. As more and more characteristics are described and 
performed, the microbes move from simple capacities. From activity to objecthood. Leibniz’s discourse 
on metaphysics (1686) contains a description of a similar process of becoming an individual 
substance which, later in his philosophy he refers to in terms of the Monadology — the construction of 
the world image: “it is certainly true that when several predicates are attributed to the same subject, 
and this subject is not attributed to any other, it is called an individual substance”. The process of 
Movement of displacement and transformation as things are produced by new arrangements as form. 
Form is always matter in terms of a further move of translation. 
Form Matter 
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discerning variables and measuring them in terms of technological uptake is a process of attributing 
predicates to society, moving it towards the status of a complete and individual notion or substance. 
Transformation and displacement puts end to a unity of explanation that starts with an individual 
notion appearing in and organising another register rendering that register mere statements about the 
referent. And it opts for a different sort of unity, one of becoming or performance rather than that built 
around the active in the passive. As such, the signified loses its fixed position as source of explanation 
and ordering because it is constituted through the movement and alignment of objects into 
relationships that are only then seen as possessing logical unity after they are arranged.  
The symbolic required fixing a signified source. Fixing society required a moveable dislocated 
technology. Technology becomes a mass of equivalence waiting in front of an independent society to 
intervene and organise it. Fixing technology similarly requires the meltdown of society into a mass of 
equivalence. Latour (1999) says: 
“but where does this fixity come from? Only from the settlement that anchors the 
object of reference as one extremity facing the statement on the other side across a 
yawning gap. Ferments exist, however, does not qualify one of the poles [...] but the 
whole series of transformation that make up the reference”.  
The allegorical requires the dislocation of everything into equivalence into movement. The task then is 
to understand how a symbolic explanation becomes fixed and stable rather than assuming stability for 
all time to do this we have to understand mass and movement. The space that the allegorical makes 
visible is this zone of movement. It is this space that we want to describe as the virtual. The task that 
Benjamin set to was describing this zone or space as mass that he saw as a result of modern 
technologies of reproduction. We will now turn to Benjamin to understand this mass as enabling limit 
that we want to call the virtual. 
Walter Benjamin’s Allegorical Unity 
Benjamin was concerned with how the unity of the symbolic was achieved. Benjamin’s project can be 
understood as reclaiming the allegorical mode seen as inferior or as a failed symbol and reconfiguring 
the symbolic as allegorical in nature. The analytical move is reversed. The usual method starts with 
stable located sources and describes or explains change in form of another category, e.g. technology. 
Here with Benjamin we start with movement and attempt to account for stability. What needs 
describing is fixity from movement, this is the actual from the virtual.  
If the Kantian notion of the symbolic is about a unity of form and content as we have seen, then 
communication occurs immediately because the idea is in and is the symbol. Bell (1997) says that as 
opposed to the immediacy of the symbol, allegory finds its expression in “the flow of time”. The 
difference is that allegorical relations as we have seen are historically contingent. While the symbolic 
mode’s immediacy is taken to be outside of time and universal because, traditionally, understanding of 
the symbolic mode excludes the work that has to go on in aligning or folding up and securing the 
symbolic relationship from the analysis. However, as Bell says, since the symbol attempts to signify 
something beyond its self it lets in time. Its unity is illusionary. The appearance of unity between 
society in technology requires us to buy into an ahistorical view of the unity of form and content.  
Benjamin (1977) makes the same distinction but does so by locating the symbolic within time: 
The Virtualisation of Digital Photography 
Jonathan Woodrow  
Athenea Digital - num. 1 primavera 2002-  8 
“The distinction between the two modes is therefore to be sought in the 
momentariness which allegory lacks […] there [In the symbol] we have momentary 
totality, here [in allegory] we have progression in a series of moments”.  
Here Benjamin recasts the universal symbolic unity as a temporally historically contingent totality 
reducing correspondence between sign and signified to Latours transformations and displacements. 
While allegory is about relations through time, this connects the symbolic mode with the allegorical. 
Since the symbolic constitutes one moment, it is a single moment in allegorical progression. As such 
the allegorical needs the series of symbolic moments and as we have seen the symbolic, its self has 
to be arranged from objects relating allegorically. The greater then for Benjamin is allegory since it is 
allegory that is the mode of symbolic constitution. Benjamin’s project as Hetherington and Law point 
out is to understand how this relationship works, that is how unity is temporally achieved. They say 
“Benjamin seeks to extract from the material flux [series of moments] of the world, an eternal image, a 
monad [a single moment] that comes to represent the world as a whole”. It is this relationship that we 
want to describe as that between the actual and the virtual. The virtual describes the series of 
moments and the actual describes the moment or the monad. In order to understand this relationship, 
we have to understand first the moment or symbolic unity as embedded in tradition, that this is about a 
process of recording arrangements of the world. 
We find all this in Benjamin’s descriptions of Aura and technologies of reproduction. Aura for Benjamin 
is a recasting of the features of unity and momentariness of the symbolic mode in terms of the 
allegorical mode. In “The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction” (1969) Benjamin argues 
for the dissolution of the aura of the work of art at the hands of reproductive technologies and mass 
movement. It is in the contrast between mass production and uniqueness that we find the constitution 
of aura through the allegoric mode. What is the aura (or moment) of a piece of work? It is that which a 
copy made through reproductive technologies lacks uniqueness in time and space. He says: 
“Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its 
presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to 
be”.  
Just as Benjamin describes the symbol as rooted in the moment, so the originality or uniqueness of an 
object is made through its spacio-temporal location and it is this that gives an object its authenticity. 
“The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its 
beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which 
it has experienced. Since the historical testimony rests on the authenticity, the 
former, too, is jeopardised by reproduction when substantive duration ceases to 
matter.” 
The uniqueness of an object comes from its embeddedness in history or tradition. In the reproduced 
object, we find a parallel with the Kantian notion of the timeless symbol. Unlike the Kantian symbol 
which is understood to be outside of time where its duration “ceases to matter” Benjamin’s aura is a 
product of its duration in time, that is, a product of all its history so far. Its momentariness is its 
testimony to its historical constitution. The momentariness of the symbol is a snap shot of its current 
temporal location which is always unfolding and which is always a product of its past. Benjamin 
describes the historicity of the object in allegorical terms when he says: “the uniqueness of a work of 
art is inseparable from its being embedded in the fabric of tradition”.  
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“The technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of 
tradition. By making many reproductions, it substitutes a plurality of copies for a 
unique existence. Moreover, by permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or 
listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These 
two processes lead to a tremendous shattering which is the obverse of the 
contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind. Both processes are intimately 
connected with the contemporary mass movements.” 
If aura is dependent on locating in time and space then reproduction technologies dislocate the aura in 
two moves. Firstly, Benjamin describes how they overcome spatial location by conquering distance as 
copies can go where originals cannot, into books and homes. Secondly, they can go to many please 
at the same time there by destroying the temporal location of the original, lifting it from tradition. All this 
is achieved by the replacement of the unique with a “plurality of copies” and is part of “contemporary 
mass movements”. 
Weber (1996) helps us understand how mass and movements are essential to understanding the 
move from the unique to plurality. He translates “By making many reproductions, it substitutes a 
plurality of copies for a unique existence” as “by multiplying the reproduction [of the artwork, the 
technique of reproduction] replaces its unique occurrence for one that is massive or mass-like”. The 
move is not simply from art taking its place traditionally in the “here and now” to a collection or a 
plurality. The move is from the former to a mass. Mass is tied to the technique of reproduction of not 
simply a result. Weber explains that we can discern from Benjamin’s writings that mass movements 
are the corollary of the detachment from tradition that Benjamin writes of above as the decline of the 
aura. The important moves are temporal movements from the moment and spatial Weber says “for the 
aura relates to mass not just as uniqueness does to multiplicity but also in spatial terms, as a fixed 
location does to one that is caught up in an incessant and complex movement”. The aura of art for 
Benjamin takes place spatially and temporally. This is how it is embedded. Mass movement is about 
the decline of aura because it dislocates in time and space opting for movement. We can think about 
the virtual as the move towards mass movement and the actual as the move toward taking place. As 
we have seen above, the actual is about fixing time and as such it requires the movement of time and 
space. It turns out through Benjamin that these moves are more closely related because the 
movement of time and space (the virtual) is the enabling limit of actualisation. All is allegorical; the 
move to mass movement in no way changes our register; in fact it points to the redemption of aura or 
symbolic unity. This is what Weber goes on to describe. Returning to Benjamin’s other statement on 
the aura of natural objects Weber casts it in terms of setting a scene or having the aura take place: 
“On a summer afternoon, resting, to follow a chain of mountain’s on the horizon or a 
branch casting its shadow on the person resting — that is what it means to breathe 
in the aura of these mountain’s, of this branch”.  
Aura here makes sense in front of and as separated from a viewing subject. As such part of the 
construction of aura is the securing of a point to be distanced from, this secures the subject. Weber 
concludes that the taking place of the aura is a process of taking leave from a point in constructing 
that point. It achieves the appearance of locatedness and distance by a process of self-detachment.  
“The aura would be able to return in the age of technical reproducibility because, as 
the appearance or apparition of an irreducible separation, it was never uniquely its 
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self but always constituted in a process of self detachment: detachment from the self 
as demarcation of the self.”  
If the aura were uniquely itself then we would view technologies of reproduction as something that 
happens to the aura from outside. Here however, its own process of demise that involves technology 
constitutes the aura. The aura is technical and social, human and nonhumans in a process of fixing 
and unfixing. It is this process that we need to understand to grasp the relations between virtual, as 
enabling limit, and actual, as arranging a world. 
Tradition and Movement as an Enabling Limit 
The tradition that aura is embedded into isn’t fixed but it is always unfolding:  
“This tradition itself is thoroughly alive and extremely changeable. An ancient statue 
of Venus, for example, stood in a different traditional context with the Greek’s, who 
made it an object of veneration, than with the clerics of the middle ages, who viewed 
it as an ominous idol. Both of them, however, were equally confronted with its 
uniqueness, that is, its aura”.  
If the aura or uniqueness is inseparable from its historical context then it does not come from a 
particular arrangement of meaning but from the fact that it is secured as a located object in terms of its 
context. Each tradition that it appears in rewrites as it maintains it as an object. Its history then is the 
accumulation of different rewritings, what it has been to different situations. Each rewriting secures it in 
contextual terms as an object that is rewritable here and now. The result is that objects or aura 
locatedness are their own manner of progression through a series of moments or historical and 
cultural locations (see figure 2). Movement or virtualisation secures the object as a recording space 
through its constant reactualisation. We can think about actual as writing on to the virtual recording 
space. It is in this sense that the virtual is an enabling limit. Writing and rewriting is the process of self-
demarcation through movement or virtualisation. 
  
 
Figure 2. 
Benjamin’s piece on collecting books (1969) further illustrates the constitution of aura as the 
accumulation of allegorical arrangements of meaning, as a space for writing and its links to symbolic 
unity as writing of the world. Benjamin says of the book and its collector: “the period, the region, the 
craftsmanship, the former ownership — for a true collector the whole background of an item adds up 
to the magic encyclopaedia whose quintessence is the fate of his object”. Parker (1997) commenting 
on this quotation says it exemplifies Benjamin’s tendency to see a grander narrative in the specific 
object. The grand narrative is more than the objects immediate history “but history itself as it spills out 
from history’s most conservative vessel”. In Benjamin, we find the idea that the work of tradition and 
history is about aligning the world to produce the aura of the object. The aura then as Hetherington 
and Law point out is akin to the Monad of Leibniz; they quote Benjamin: “the idea is a monad — that 
means briefly every idea contains the image of the world. The purpose of representation of the idea is 
nothing less than an abbreviated outline of this image of the world”. It is the relationship between this 
Form Matter 
Benjamin’s moment of 
symbolic unity 
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history and the object that we find a parallel with symbolic unity. Parker explains that Benjamin quotes 
Proust on the relationship between these two, “the past is somewhere beyond the reach of the intellect 
and unmistakably present in some material object”. Just as the signified is out of reach to the senses 
where the sign is not. The object is and stands for its own history, with the monad analogy we can go 
further and say the object’s aura is an organised unity reflecting the history of a world since it is the 
point around which the world, past, present and future are arranged.  
Serres (1968) says “The science of Conic sections shows clearly that there exists a single point from 
which an apparent disorder can be organised into harmony […] For a given plurality, for a given 
disorder there only exists one point around which everything can be placed in order; this point exists 
and it is unique. From anywhere else disorder and indetermination remain. From then on, to know a 
plurality of things consists in discovering the point from which their disorder can be resolved, into a 
unique law of order”. Benjamin’s moments are monads that ordered the world. They are scenes in the 
sense of the Monadology rather than the Kantian scenography (see Latour 1999). The Aura is the 
point around which order is produced. It is the point that is written and secured as it orders. 
The difficulty for the timeless symbol was in the leap between signified and signs, here the leap is 
mediated by the same allegorical logic that makes the world image. The collector in inheriting or 
writing his own recontextualises the book, makes it his own, owns it as the ancient statue of Venus 
was past on from tradition to tradition to be rewritten, so Benjamin took texts and translated them 
adding them to his collection. It is through constant recontextualisation and translation that unity is 
produced. That which is beyond the intellect (we now see as history) becomes united in the moment 
with the object as it is translated as the world is aligned to secure its aura in time and space. The 
effect of translation is the creation of a monad as Hetherington and Law point out: 
“Through the monad […] Benjamin sought to hold time still so that the materiality and 
spatiality of human history could be crystallised in a baroque image, often of a ruined 
past, that would shatter the illusion of progress and offer redemptive glimpses of 
hope for the future. For Benjamin, these distilled images are the vehicle for allegory”.  
The maintenance of unity is achieved through movement that is through a series of moments or 
translation. We can say that the actual is achieved through the virtual. It also throws the usual 
methods above into a new light. They are themselves world images, allegorical alignments of the 
world into monads that hold their own time up. Within the monad everything is explained symbolically, 
the world is sorted into accordance with either society or technology. 
The move to actualisation then is a process of virtualisation. Unity is achieved through alignment that 
is always a process of rewriting the whole world enabled by its blankness or recordable surface 
secured by virtualisation. The question for us then in terms of technology is how is a technology 
written? This is not the same formulation as technology in society. As we have seen the allegorical 
rendering of the question drives us to look at the arrangements of social and technical elements in 
arranged together, technology no longer finds its essence in itself as separate from this process of 
recording and arranging. The question becomes how do we secure a technology out of the mass 
movement of humans and nonhumans. Since this question concerns essence of technology as 
actualised or brought forth then the obvious place to turn to is Heidegger’s “the question concerning 
technology.” Heidegger is an even more appropriate source to find some analytical direction since 
Heidegger’s four modes of causation that constitute the move of bringing forth or setting in place 
(poises) can be thought of as describing the move from the virtual to the actual. This is no surprise 
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because Heidegger was concerned with modern technologies and with collapsing dichotomies thus 
describing mass and movement as Benjamin. More importantly, Heidegger is concerned with bringing 
forth as an act of bringing things into accordance, which is about the allegorical mode.  
Heidegger and Poises 
Hamill looked for the essence of technology in terms of means to ends, what does it do for us. This 
instrumental definition is described in terms of ontical questioning in “the question concerning 
technology.” That is, questioning in terms of how things match or accord with what we have already 
set up, i.e. the always already. The always already is that which is arranged or set in place and is 
taken as original, it provides a yard stick for everything else, just as society explains technology. 
Heidegger arrives at the ontological question via a trip through the notion of causality where he 
reconfigures causation as responsibility. Briefly Heidegger points out that causality is tied up with the 
instrumental definition of technology. Technology is the means by which an end is brought about. 
Heidegger presents us with four modes of causation and illustrates them with their co responsibility for 
the production of a chalice.  
For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes: (1) the causa materialis, the material, 
the matter out of which, for example, a chalice is made; (2) the causa formalis, the form, the shape 
into which the material enters; (3) the causa finalis, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation 
to which the required chalice is determined as to its form and matter; (4) the causa efficiens, which 
brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith. 
Heidegger’s project here is to uncover the essence of technology by tracing its instrumental 
representation back to four-fold causality and recover something of Greek thought. He argues that 
today we are more accustomed to representing causality in terms of the causa efficiens, as that which 
brings about effects. He stresses that bringing about here in common understanding is understood in 
terms of obtaining effects. The problem comes with the understanding of causa, which means to bring 
about, to effect, and it belongs to the Romans and to our understanding. Heidegger says that the 
Greek from which we inherit the four causes has nothing to do with bringing about and effecting. The 
Greeks used aition, that to which something is indebted. Heidegger argues then that the four causes 
are interrelated by their co-responsibility for something else. So the chalice is indebted to the matter, 
the silver from which it is fashioned but at the same time it is indebted to “chalicness” the form into 
which the silver enters which is co-responsible with the silver for the chalice. Thirdly the chalice is 
indebted to “that which in advance confines the chalice within the realm of consecration and 
bestowal”. It is through this that “the chalice is circumscribed as a sacrificial vessel”. For that which 
circumscribes or gives bounds, Heidegger uses the Greek telos, in the sense that bounds don’t stop a 
thing but instead set a thing off within them on its way to what it will be after production. Telos, usually 
translated as “aim” or “purpose” doesn’t capture this aspect of responsibility. The chalice then is 
indebted to the practice of sacrificial rites as the telos that is responsible for the complete 
circumscription of what silver (matter) and chalicness (form) together present as a sacrificial vessel. All 
three then are responsible. The fourth responsibility is that of the silversmith who usually figures as the 
causa eficiens, the cause of the effect that is the chalice. Heidegger argues that there is no place in 
Greek for the responsibility that the silversmith has. For Heidegger he is responsible for gathering 
together the three modes of responsibility and so he is co-responsible for bringing forward the chalice 
and setting it off into being, indebted for it’s subsistence to the four-fold ways of being responsible. 
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Next, Heidegger makes the move to say that what unites these ways of being responsible is that they 
are modes of occasioning, that is, bringing forth into the here and now. In bringing forward the chalice 
as lying before us and lying ready, these modes of responsibility bring it into appearance, bring it into 
presence, or we might say, bringing a world into presence. In so doing they set it on its way to arriving 
at what it is says Heidegger. For Heidegger then, bringing forth is about occasioning or inducing to go 
forward into appearance  — having a world take place. 
Having Digital Photography Take Place in a Photographic 
Society 
Turning to our digital evening now we can ask how does digital photography take place for individuals. 
We can analysis their projects in terms of Heidegger’s four-fold reconfiguration of causation. We can 
look at which equipment they invoke in which practices to particular ends and how they organise 
themselves in the process of performing or revealing their alignments of activity and technology into 
monads — that is how they align, for a time, a version. The data was recorded at an evening of a 
photographic society where members presented some of their photos and talked about their projects.  
Some Examples 
This first extract comes from John’s introduction: 
J: [alls I’ve done is I’ve (.) brought (.) roughly a dozen prints (.) to show you ] (.) and they’re what I’ve  
A: [general commotion]  
J: produced over the last fifteen months since I’ve had the computer (.) more by trial and error (.) but 
I’ve just bought one or two (.) just to give you some idea of what — some are (.) not so good as others 
(.) but (.) this one here (.) I produced this (.) and unfortunately (.) these coconuts (.) out in (.) where I 
took this (.) they chop all the outside off so they were white (.) so I attempted to colour them (.) but at 
the end of the day I thought (.) it’s no good worth it (.) so (.) I printed another one but without the 
coconuts  
A: [laughing] 
J: and (.) put in the curb (.) as well (.) it takes a wee bit of time but not (.) not such a great deal of time 
(.) and most of my pictures have only got minor details (.) er I don’t consider that to be anything drastic 
cause you could do that in the dark room anyway (.) so whe- when people get worried about digital 
imaging you got to remember that (.) where the bloke in the cupboard who’s not with us now 
unfortunately (.) he used to produce pictures (.) with five or six images (.) on one piece of paper (.) and 
we all thought it was fantastic (.) and nobody ever said (.) that wasn’t a photograph  
This first pair of images opens the way for John to introduce the level of alteration that he wants to 
argue is acceptable. From gathering together digital imaging and the darkroom as part of the heritage 
to the darkroom as cite of artistic production, John gathers practice and heritage around digital 
imaging, opening up a past, present and future for it digital and the user as artist. 
John’s comment “it’s just a piece of art” removes the digital image from the photographic claim to 
reasonable truth and the concerns of representation into the realm of “truth autonomous” art where 
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image stands on its own away from referent. It represents the final category into which all digital and 
photography is placed. Tracing the argument backwards, the “art” John refers to is the hypothetical 
montage image produced by the bloke in the darkroom that no one would deny was a photograph and 
a photographer. The darkroom, then, was always about pieces of art, about the collection of separate 
images to the cite of a single piece of paper creating the appearance of representation without there 
existing anything past the representation. The photograph was always a product of calculation, of 
organisation, gathering and performing rather than reflection of external reality. 
Contrast this with the Billy’s offering that came after John’s presentation. Here Billy introduces her 
work.  
B: all of these photographs I’m going to show you are basic (.) I’ve done no moving and haven’t been 
able to take anything out or put anything in (.) so all I’ve done (.) is (.) I’ve taken photographs for a long 
time: (.) which (.) I go out and sketch and then I take photographs (.) if I haven’t had time to do a 
sketch (.) I’ll do photographs (.) and (.) I can bring them home and use them (.) not copy them I use 
them (.) a::nd I’ve got the memories of (.) where I’ve bee::n I bring back with me and as soon as I look 
at a photograph I’m back there (.) so:: (.) this is why I take photographs.  
B: these are all (.) the photograph was put into the scanner (.) if they’::re (.) seven by five I’ve (.) erm 
enlarge them (.) erm (.) hundred and fifty percent (.) if they’re six by four (.) I’ve enlarged them (.) two 
hundred percent which gives me A4 (.) or as near to A4 as I can get (.) erm (.) I put them into the 
scanner and pre— and with the mouse I can press the button and (.) and it (.) scans it fo::r me (.) and 
then if I feel that I want to lighten the highlights or darken the highlights (.) all I do I’ve got (.) I put on 
erm (.) oh (I can’t think what they’re called) I’m I’m no good at all these things I don’t remember names 
but (.) I can get it (.) I can make the highlights lighter or darker (.) I can make the shadows lighter or 
darker (.) and I can make the (.) midtones lighter or darker (.) I rarely (.) do m (.) any mucking about 
like that because (.) I just— depending on the paper (.) I’ve experimented with various types of paper, 
just ordinary plain (.) erm (.) paper, thin paper with thicker ca::rd (.) and then I had a cheapy (.) erm (.) 
paper (.) gloss (.) gloss paper but it was a bit sort of rough to feel (.) I forget the name of it (.) and then 
I went to:: (.) erm (.) (illford) which I get fro::m (.)jessops (.) because I find they’re as cheap as any 
body (.) and I got some illford paper from the::m (.) and (.) they’d reduced the price (.) plus the fact 
being the a student (.) in ceramics (.) at (.) (townhill) college you get ten percent off= 
A: =hhhh.= 
B: =So that takes quite a bit off because (.) it is expensive (.) I find the paper (.) well the way I use it it 
is expensive because I go through reams of it (.) plus the fa::ct (.) the printing er the the ca::rtridges (.) 
are expensive (.) I’m on my about my fo::rth lot now this is is just before Christmas (.) but (.) 
nevertheless it’s because I’m experimenting all the time so I won’t waste anymore time so (.) I’ll show 
you now what I’ve been doing if you can see (.) now [coughs] (.) this was the very fi:rst one I did (.) I 
don’t know whether you can see them but if they’re not big enough (.) I’ll pass them round 
U: I can see them 
B. erm that (.) is the light on at all  
U. yeh that’s better 
B: that’s crackley woods 
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U: no leave the light on max 
A. general commotion 
U: it’s just when [I lean back] 
erm that’s crackley woods (.) now that just went straight into the scan— into (.) the printer into the 
scanner and went straight through (.) erm that o::ne I did the same thing (.) er I didn’t do any adjusting 
but I did find (.) that on different paper (.) it wasn’t as good (.) this is just erm (.) a note book paper 
that’s a smooth one (.) and I found that— I find that’s the best paper (.) for me to u::se er(.) so those 
are those two but if you— you can pass them round if you want to look 
Billy stakes out her project as much in terms of what she does not do as she does in terms of what 
she does do. She has not moved anything about, added or taken anything away. Presented like this 
the image and its components that might be moved about are at the default position in a sense. Her 
reference to movement, etc., refers to John’s presentation and other demonstrations of manipulation 
so Billy’s comment is significant as a signpost of the distinctiveness of her project. We are told that the 
photos presented are from photos placed in the scanner; “now that just went straight into the scan, 
into the printer, into the scanner and went straight through”. The key moments in the process are 
inputting and output. In the middle things might be enlarged or improved in terms of light contrast, but 
the key technology presented are input and output devises. Importantly the images have a readable 
existence previously to the process they start as photographs already. Output is recognisably equal to 
input. Billy’s talk then is around printing issues, paper, size, expense, and the development of her 
abilities occurs through experimenting in these areas. The computer acts as an enhancing technology 
and actually is secondary to image as its facilitator. Contrast this with John’s description of the 
darkroom practice of making montage, the image originates from there, the scene depicted never 
existed. For John the computer is primary, image is secondary. It comes out as a product. This 
following conversation between Billy and John brings the origins of image and the primacy of the 
computer and its environment into focus.  
A: have you done all these from slides 
J: all of these are from slides  
B: well what do you do just put your slide in the scanner [or]  
J:          [use] that— (.) like D’s got his minolta 
scanner here you put your slide in (.) you scan it through and a picture comes up just like that there  
B: really 
J: and then [you] work it from there 
B:    [ah] 
A: XXXX- 
U: see (.) if you do that you don’t need a digital camera (.) after you just bought one  
A: [laughing] 
J: you see (.) the sl— actually slides are more difficult to get good pictures out of than negatives  
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B: yeh 
J: because of the contrast range  
A: well you don’t put a negative in do you 
J: yeh you can put negatives in yeh 
B: really 
J: yeh 
B: oh 
U: that was a negative 
B: right 
An audience member asks John about whether transparencies were used and John says they were. 
Billy squeezes what is clearly a revelation to her through her version of digital technology. She uses a 
flat bed scanner and asks if you place your transparency on that. John answers by introducing her to a 
different input devise, the Minolta scanner looks like a CPU tower with a small slot on the front. He 
explains that the slide goes in it and a picture comes up just like that there on the computer screen to 
one side of his presentation. Billy is surprised, it “really” demonstrates further the novelty of this to her. 
John continues with it and then you work it from there. Two things are important here, transparencies 
need other equipment to be read. Alone, they present difficulties, they are designed for injection into 
another set of technologies that make them appear. Onto this, John adds that you then work them 
from the screen. Unlike the flat bed scanner and photograph, John’s images require the computer to 
come into view to be revealed. The photo on the flat bed scanner does not need to be entered into the 
economy of the computer and its environment to be read and have currency. John later goes further to 
suggest that actually it is better to start with the most fundamental stage in photographic processing, 
the negative as you can process it in a number of different ways. It becomes clear now that with this 
arrangement of technology negative, Minolta scanner, manipulation software that renders negative 
readable and finally printing it is only a short step to the darkroom analogy. Picture originate become 
are sent forth by manipulation in John’s economy. Billy’s practice then can be seen as quite different.  
A third presentation offers a different conception of image again: 
D: everything on the computer is working in red, green and blue and the combinations of the red, 
green and blue er from naught to two hundred and fifty-five in each of the cases so you can see on 
this one that er although the statue was absolutely pure white in the shadows you can see that we’ve 
got blue and green are very similar in value red (.) is lacking some what alright so in effect we’re going 
towards a cyan type of colour”. 
Derek presents the pixelation of image as he describes the manipulations that can be done on 
individual pixels when image is reduced to red, green and blue values. The economy that makes 
images visible here is one of graphs charts and numbers.  
The point to make is that all three as gatherings of practice, technology and people differ as 
economies with distinct centres of gravity. Image for Billy is raw material for painting, memory aid, and 
translation of scene that exists outside of the computer set-up which represents an extra option but 
The Virtualisation of Digital Photography 
Jonathan Woodrow  
Athenea Digital - num. 1 primavera 2002-  17 
which is nothing more that an economy of reproduction where input equals output. As a gatherer, she 
is an artist who brings together paper printing, ink painting, easels and invokes all manner of artistic 
material. Here purpose or the telos is reproduction, the form that digital photography takes is 
reproductive technology. For John, image originates as a product from the computer, output is 
different to input. Input is calculated, collaged and printed as something different. It is about darkroom 
practice what photography was always about. John invokes darkrooms and paper. His artist’s status is 
as an arranger of montages. The form digital takes is in terms of the production of image. Our quick 
look at Derek’s comments again demonstrate a different economy of activity, pixel based manipulation 
but manipulation of number and graph curve. Image is about mathematised. Digital is about 
calculation; we might call him a technician. In a sense, we can see the scaling up and down of digital 
technologies across these three. At its widest gathering, Billy has it as a facilitator, it’s about image 
practice. Then comes John describing the origins of image in terms of picking images apart by their 
subject, people objects, and reducing photographs to layers. Then Derek scales it down further to 
mathematics and graph manipulation. Where is digital photography, is it in the mathematisation of 
image or the movement of objects and the creation of something new in the artistic tradition of the 
darkroom or is it the reproduction of images facilitating painting and aiding the sketching process? Is it 
photograph, scanner, printer, or negative, scanner manipulation, printer, or mathematics calculation? It 
is all of these and none of these. These are versions, organised worlds of form and tradition, which are 
brought forth and rewriten on to the space that is digital photography. 
This is the essence of technology or technics, it is a mode of bringing forth. To understand how all the 
above are connected and equally writings of digital then we have to understand essence and poises or 
bring forth.  
Weber, Heidegger and Wessen 
Weber (1996) explains that the word usually translated as essence is Wesen. He argues that essence 
is not what Heidegger was after in talking about the essence of technology. He say “technics [Weber’s 
preferred translation of technology] […] compels us to rethink the meaning of Wesen and no longer 
construe it in the sense either of genre or of essentia”. Weber translates Wesen as goings-on as the 
German communicates a sense of staying in play rather than fixed in essence of possessing essence. 
This is important and it repeats our theme of movement rather than located identity. Going-on and 
staying in play invokes an unsteady unfolding over time rather than a fixed timeless existence.  
Weber says “the goings-on of technics are on goings, not just in the sense of being long standing, 
staying in play, lasting, but in the more dynamic one of moving away from the idea of a pure and 
simple self-identity of technology. What goes on in and as technics, its Wesen, is not itself technical”. 
We have seen this last point above. Technology goes on indebted not to distinct social and technical 
categories anticeding it. It is not an effect of society but it is indebted to humans and nonhumans, 
traditions and other technologies, social procedures all mixed together. Its essence or Wesen is in 
bringing forth or in the act of poises — that is the movement from concealment to unconcealment. Its 
Wesen is in its being revealed, made visible. The essence of digital technology is not located in one 
particular set up but is in the act of bringing forth. How do versions relate?  
The first thing to understand is that we have said that Wesen is going-on. In that sense these versions 
can not be taken as fixed arrangements they go on and have to stay in play. Revealing is the 
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translation of Heidegger’s term entbergen but as Weber points out translators are aware that the 
sense is actually harbouring forth where Bergen means to harbour or conceal and ent means forth or 
a change of place with respect to a former condition. Revealing then is understood as an act of 
bringing forth into security. However, Weber argues that there is an interesting contraction missed. 
Harbouring is certainly about securing, sureing up, and Weber points out it is talked of in terms of 
cherishing or protecting. However, harbouring forth, leaving shelter is an act of unsecuring “to venture 
into a certain insecurity.” The mistake is to read Heidegger’s central tenet as, for anything to go on it 
has to be secured. Weber translates entbergen as unsecuring. Ant assumes the first. It describes how 
versions or networks come together through translation but stops with security. The assumption is that 
everything acts in favour of the network at the point of security. This leaves us with three versions of 
digital technology all separate networks and no explanation for why these three might be brought 
together, why do these people need or choose to communicate? Weber tells us that the act of 
securing is answered by the act of unsecuring. He says: “technics starts out from a place that is 
determined by that which it seeks to exclude. Insecurity is its enabling limit”. We can read this as 
recording since recording requires a degree of blankness or a lack of definition that is necessarily 
unsecured. We find this blankness or the under defined is described in Serres as noise or third man or 
parasite and as vital in communication and ordering. Serres (1982) talks about the thing to be 
communicated in its empirical situation that is content in a particular form. Since form varies from 
situation to situation, the logician is faced with teasing out the abstract notion or content from the noise 
of the many situations. Serres (1982) says: 
“It is one and the same act to recognise an abstract being through the occurrences 
of its concrete, standardised form and to come to an agreement about this 
recognition, in other words, the act of eliminating cacography, the attempt to 
eliminate noise, is at the same time the condition of the apprehension of the abstract 
form and the condition of successful communication”. 
Serres goes on to explain that if it all was noise we couldn’t differentiate anything from anything else 
“at the extreme limits of empiricism, meaning is totally plunged in to noise the space of communication 
is granular”. The foot note says “Whence we see that if we admit the principle of undiscernables, the 
monads neither listen to nor understand each other. They are without doors or windows, an implication 
that Leibniz made coherent”. ANT leaves us with a granular space with lots of disconnected monads, it 
fails to make their communication vi sible. The alternative is no noise, which, as Serres says, result in 
silence, no communication. Thus, a Monad’s arranged world requires others as noise. The task is to 
maintain and design noise as noise designs the monad. To secure the abstract united world is the 
same act as writing the noise. 
We have seen from Heidegger that the effects of unsecuring or revealing involves a covering of 
alternatives, with Benjamin we see that alternatives or past arrangements are required and present in 
the current arrangement. This also involves a covering or putting out of reach alternatives while being 
a product of alternatives. So unsecuring requires that we understand how monads come to arrange 
other monads as part of their own writing through excluding what shapes them. This involves 
understanding alternatives as noise to be fort against in these two ways. 
We have already seen Billy’s concern to describe her project by closing down alternatives, and writing 
her own activity on top where she said her photographs are not about movement, removement or 
replacement but are about taking photographs. In an example of unsecuring as opening to 
alternatives, John provides an example of how the designing of noise in the system is at the same 
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time an unsecuring or a virtualisation, an enabling limit that affords a new set of arrangements or a 
new securing. 
J: well (.) this last three weeks I can tell you I’ve been I’ve been really struggling with grey skies (.) and 
(.) I’ve been I’ve printed some grey squares out on the computer to see whether it was printing grey 
and they looked quite good (.) so I printed cut those off and I had an A4 sheet (.) short then (.) and I 
put a backing sheet on the back for it to slide down (.) but it never took the glossy one it took the one 
at the back (.) which was up side down (.) an old piece of paper that (.) I’ve got and its gone (.) and its 
printed me the best grey sky [I’ve ever seen (.) but its on the back] its 
A:   [------------(laughing)-----------------] 
J: on the back of an ordinary sheet of Epsom paper (.) and its printed at the glossy setting (.) fourteen 
forty (.) and its superb (.) so don’t throw away you’re old sheets of paper just turn them over and 
you’ve got a smashing mat print 
U: don’t don’t tell Epsom that they’ll be selling them as double sided paper 
Here we have presenting a mistake an accident that ends up producing the results he was seeking 
through a well-rehearsed set of procedures. He sets up the shape of the mistake in terms of the 
original set of procedures. We have backing sheets that are old sheets of paper in up side down with 
respect to the printer set up for best results. We have Epsom invoked and their concern for marketing 
quality. We also have John’s project for a grey sky and his testing procedure. All this arrangement 
constitutes a settlement or a world organised to have a grey sky-printing machine that satisfies 
everyone concerned. Epsom supply instruction manuals for best results, users introduce a backing 
sheet, which organises old from new sheets. The world is organised, is secured, but as things are 
repeated (there is a procedural air to John’s report) the shape of alternatives is made clearer. Backing 
sheets have the opportunity to slip wrong sides are arranged and worked up and given the opportunity 
in the current alignment to be printed. In terms of the first procedure old, and wrong, and upside down 
are as noise in the system. However, the system designs them as such. Every locking down and 
covering opens up and shapes alternatives — that is, every securing is answered by an unsecuring. 
Here we see the alternative actualised secured as the old settlement is secured a mistake occurs that 
spins off a new alignment of tech and people, practice and procedure. A marketing opportunity. A 
compossible bifurcation. This is the process of securing through movement or unsecuring. 
Society equals Multiplicity 
The community is required to maintain digital as a recording space where different configurations of its 
tradition and procedures can be shared. This secures also the society as virtual as with each monad 
arranged what constitutes the member ship, artists, technicians, and their history the darkroom are 
mobilised and organised as alternatives are closed down and new ones opened up. A new 
arrangement goes spinning out across the recording space that is digital society. The society requires 
a recordable surface to exist and joining is immersion into it and recording on to it.  
Our last example comes from Billy’s description of getting into digital photography and it is clear that 
she goes through different configurations of humans and nonhumans: 
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B: anyway when I decided I would buy a computer for photography I went to ti:ny I went to::: um oh all 
the other people that do these packages for you and then I went to: um pc wo:::rld and I got so 
confused with all all of the things that they have got there and I decided that (.) as I didn’t know what I 
was doi::ng (.) I could have I could go to tiny and they would give me a camera and a a scanner and 
everything that I needed plus all these ga::mes and all sorts of things that I got free but I didn’t want all 
of those things (.) s::o in the end I decided I’d go to a little shop (.) in jubilee crescent (.) can’t even 
remember the name of it (.) a::nd I went into the shop and I said to them look I know nothing about 
computers but what I want is really one for photography (.) I said I I and I really will need a computer I 
know but I want a scanner and a . erm (.) and a printer . and a camera because I didn’t realise that I 
could do prints without having . just from an ordinary camera= that’s how much I knew about it so I 
said look (.) I want to spend two thousand pounds (.) I want a good scanner (.) I want a good printer (.) 
I want a good computer (.) and I want a good camera (.) well the camera cost me five ninety nine (.) 
Which I needn’t have bought but (.) I didn’t realise that (.) knowing nothing (.) and having no one to 
ask so I said to them in the shop could you do what I want (.) so he said yes (.) so he fixed me up with 
everything I wanted (.) I left it entirely to him (.) 
There is much we can comment on here but space denies us a comprehensive analysis. The key 
points to this discussion are discursive orderings that chart the move from the commercial certainty of 
what constitutes digital to the community who trade in multiple versions of digital technology 
maintaining it as an open recording space. Billy’s story of getting into digital has her negotiating the 
packages on offer from the commercial world to the custom made package of the smaller trader. PC 
world, tiny computers and “all the other people that do these packages" present a background against 
which the uniqueness of the photographic society is charted. The story presents us with a large 
category of a large commercial sector, presenting consumers with set packages. Billy starts by 
negotiating the packages on offer from a position of ignorance, she says “I didn’t know what I was 
looking for” and so she is injected into this economy of preorganised package. On the way, she finds 
extras that did not want: games, etc. In the end she opts for the smaller trader. She goes to a little 
shop, whose position in commercial terms is insignificant; she cannot remember the name, just its 
location.  
The switch here is from Billy knowing nothing and being offered up solutions as packages to her 
controlling, demanding, and tailoring. The sense is that larger business presents non negotiable 
packages with little regard for individual needs that dictates the consumer space while the smaller 
trader presents nothing but responds with expert advise. Billy reports here that she knew nothing and 
had no one to ask, yet she uses clear and definite instruction to the trader, she was clear at the time 
presenting a four-part list of definite objects required for her to be into digital photography. This is 
interesting because in negotiating the acquisition of some kit Billy presents as someone with 
outcommunity, ”having no one to ask”, without knowledge, ”knowing nothing”, but she is clear on what 
she wants. Contrast this with the conversation on input devises, the discovery of different ways of 
doing things and the need to stake out her own project in terms of other projects. She goes from 
certainty about kit without community to a world of options and personal collections and preferences 
within community.  
In addition, as we go through the immersion, kit is sidelined, games go then extra free bits, then the 
package notion for the tailored option. Significantly, the digital camera becomes an icon of what digital 
photography is not about. Notice that it is the fourth item in the list, given the closure that is achieved 
with three part lists the digital camera discursively sits outside the natural point of closure. It becomes 
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a boundary object describing the move from commercial space to the photographic society. Billy 
injects her story with hind site on that issue and is picked up on for buying a digital camera in 
conversation over input devices.  
The camera becomes the only clear marker that distinguishes the group from the commercial 
gatherings of the technology. The group is not presented as distinctly defined by their break with the 
commercial or in competition with the commercial, they are distinguished by the move to virtualisation 
of digital against the actualisation or gatherings of the commercial. The digital camera becomes a site 
where the centres of gravity are demonstrated as distinct. They are then distinguished by their gravity: 
process, versus central gathered. This is reflected in the experimental talk that permeates their 
presentations and conversations, they do not react to commerce but evolve through repetition and 
discovery. They carve out their own niche within the group and share stories. Histories come where 
projects intersect and where projects are distinct. Either way to be into digital is to develop through 
“trial and error” or going through your own “reams of paper” to gather together your own version and 
practice to write on to it to record on the social virtual space and spin out histories of what constitutes 
the technology and the society itself.  
If digital photography were gathered once for all then we could take it or leave it. It requires the 
community to exist as a series of translations, of versions. As such the community offers a space to 
move through, the community is a site of movement and recording that in turn writes and rewrites the 
society.  
Conclusions 
We started with the idea that the common sensical way to approach people and technology is to ask 
questions that seek to understand one category’s activities within the other. How does society 
organise technology? We have argued that this form of inquiry is built on the notion that explanation 
rests on a representational and causal relationship between these categories — the goal is to uncover 
and understand the logical unity between them. This is seen in the need to find valid variables in the 
category that passively registers the activities of the active and distinct category. Latour argues that 
this requires us to jump the gap between a referee point and statements made about it, and argued 
that we should understand statements as part of what configures and performs or articulates the 
referent into being through movement through transformation and displacements into moments of 
individual substance. Benjamin’s take on the symbolic parallels these ideas and locks them into an 
understanding of the monad. What became important was to understand how moment/monads or the 
actual are configured through movement, mass, and multiplicity. 
Then, Heidegger has given us an understanding of how technologies come into being, into moments. 
Heidegger’s work (understood through Weber) flags up the short falls of ANT as Heidegger requires 
us to understand the move of unsecuring through which every move of actualisation or organisation of 
a monad also requires movement and exposure to alternatives since it is itself constituted through 
alternatives as a multiplicity. Therefore, through the virtual we have a vocabulary that helps us 
understand stability through change. Unlike ANT, the virtual lets us in on the destructive movement of 
unsecuring that answers stability. ANT leaves us with a network, the collapse of which comes as a 
surprise (ANT and the other continent paper and Callon’s scallops). 
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In terms of our data, we have seen how versions or monads are organised and how, since they are by 
nature multiple, new ones spin off. The virtual, unsecuring movement helps us notice the recording 
space is the mixture of the society and the technology and it is across this space that versions of both 
are written and rewritten.  
Allegory underpins our new configuration of problematic complex, the virtual. The virtual can be 
thought of as the movement of transformation and displacement, the multiple existence of substance 
and as an enabling limit that secures, through movement, a recording space for solutions to be written 
onto, to secure the here and now. Since the virtual answers each securing with an unsecuring, we 
must look to explain stability as the management of alternatives. The essence of technology, of digital, 
is in configuring a world. The movement of technology into the home should now be read as the 
recording of a monad rather than the invasion of territory. 
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